Search results for Online CSAM

Hackers are plotting to benefit from the generosity of Halloween, Thanksgiving, and Christmas shoppers using carding attacks as we gear up for the holiday season shopping.  Online companies selling products or services are struggling with the growing issue of carding. Juniper Research predicts retailers could lose 0 billion to card-not-present (CNP) fraud by 2023. To […] The post Is Your Online Store Hacked in a Carding Attack? Here’s an Action Plan to Protect appeared first on Cyber Security News.

Action Plan Carding Carding Attack Store Hacked

Kaisen Linux is a distribution dedicated for IT professional based on Debian GNU/Linux. Large tools are integrated for diagnostics, rescue system and networks, lab creation and many more!

CISA (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency) is warning that threat actors breached a U.S. water facility by hacking into Unitronics programmable logic controllers (PLCs) exposed online. [...]

PLCs CISA

In July 2021, the online Indonesian watch store, Jam Tangan (AKA Machtwatch), suffered a data breach that exposed over 400k customer records which were subsequently posted to a popular hacking forum. The data included email and IP addresses, names, phone numbers, physical addresses and passwords stored as either unsalted MD5 or bcrypt hashes.

AKA Machtwatch Indonesian watch Jam Tangan online Indonesian watch store

Screenside Chat episode 1 with Vivek RamachandranHello hackerWe're super thrilled to introduce our new video interview series with founders and CXOs: The Screenside Chat series.For our first episode, our guest is Vivek Ramachandran.Vivek Ramachandran is a serial entrepreneur, author, and cyber security professional with over 2 decades of experience. He is currently the founder of SquareX , a browser-based cyber security solution for consumers, which recently received seed funding from Sequoia Capital Southeast Asia in May 2023.What we'll cover in the Screenside ChatVivek's journey of starting security back in the days when not a lot of resources were available.His experience of starting and eventually selling PentesterAcademy.The personal experiences or challenges in the cybersecurity field that inspired him to start SquareX.Some pressing challenges in the current cybersecurity landscape.Vivek's vision of an ideal future of online privacy and security.A sneak peak into what he'll be sharing during his IWCON 0x03 keynote speech.And more.Join us live here (happening in 30 minutesTime: 9 AM IST, 27th November 2023.If you missed the live session, you can watch the replay here.BestEditors,Infosec Writeups.Introducing IW's Video Interview Series with Founders was originally published in InfoSec Write-ups on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Interview Series Ramachandran Screenside Chat Video Interview

Malware Analysis of Remcos RAT: Exploitaion and Detection ExplainedExecutive SummarySHA256 hash:2e5c4d023167875977767da513d8889f1fc09fb18fdadfd95c66a6a890b5ca3fRemcos is a commercially available Remote Access Tool (RAT) marketed for legitimate use in surveillance and penetration testing. However, it has been leveraged in various unauthorized hacking initiatives. When deployed, Remcos establishes a backdoor, allowing comprehensive remote control over the affected system. The tool is a product of BreakingSecurity, a company specializing in cybersecurity solutions.Hackers are getting smarter by using tricks like hiding their code and adding fake code, which makes it harder for security experts to figure out how their attacks work. They're using things like image files and compression to disguise their activities.YARA signature rules are attached in Appendix A. Malware sample and hashes have been submitted to VirusTotal for further examination.High-Level Technical SummaryRemcos is an advanced remote access tool that breaks into computers using a series of hidden codes, starting with a malicious file which can be delivered from mail or dropper. It cleverly disguises its next steps within an image file, and then uses another DLL to make sure it stays on the computer even after it's restarted. Remcos can record keystrokes to steal passwords and other private information, which it logs into a file. It stays in contact with the hacker's server to send out this stolen information and to get new orders, allowing the hacker to keep a close watch and control over the infected computer.Malware CompositionThis composition of remcos consists of the following components:2e5c4d023167875977767da513d8889f1fc09fb18fdadfd95c66a6a890b5ca3fEmbedded_Remcos.exeIn a C# dropper, there's a sneaky way that malware developers are hiding bad code. They put this code inside the InitializeComponent() method. This method is normally used just for setting up how the app looks, like buttons and menus. But now, it's being used to hide something harmful. The tricky part is that this bad code looks just like regular setup code, so it's hard to spot. It's like hiding something bad inside something good, so people don't notice it.This makes it hard to find and fix the problem. It's a clever trick by hackers, and it shows how they can use parts of an app we usually trust to do sneaky things.It is extracting a byte array from a resource, possibly a file or other data embedded in the application and generating another byte array from a hard coded string.The code is setting up a user interface for a form and then performing an operation on a data resource (“SHP”) using a generated key.The _data before the encryption looks like this.The for loop processes the Data_ array in a complex way. It goes through each byte of Data_ and modifies it based on a calculation involving both Data_ and KeyGen.The calculation inside the loop involves bitwise XOR (^), addition, and modulo operations. It appears to be some form of data manipulation or encryption/decryption, where Data_ is being altered using the KeyGen byte array.First, a MethodBase object named methodBase is assigned the value kb. The MethodBase class in C# is part of the reflection namespace and is used to discover information about methods (like constructors and other methods) at runtime.Then, an array of objects named array is created and initialized with string values. This array includes this.VC, this.VR, and the literal string “Boilerplate”. VC and VR are private string fields of the class, initialized to “57775972” and “6C7978”, respectively. Therefore, the array contains these two strings along with “Boilerplate”.Finally, the Invoke method on methodBase is called, passing obj and array as arguments. This means the method represented by methodBase is being executed with obj as the target and the string array as the parameters.Before the inoke there was binary loaded successfully in modules.And if look closely it in kb.Fullname it is calling dr,hA.wP method in Ben dll.Ben DLLBy adding breakpoint after loading from module we catch the debugger.The code performs image processing, uses reflection to invoke a method, and dynamically loads an assembly from a byte array. This kind of operation is typical in applications that need to manipulate images, dynamically execute code, and potentially load plugins or modules at runtime.Sleep for 16secnew MemoryStream(array2): This creates a new MemoryStream object using array2 as its buffer. array2 is assumed to be a byte array (byte[]) that contains data compressed using the GZip algorithm. The MemoryStream is a stream based on a memory buffer, allowing for reading from and writing to memory.new GZipStream(…): This creates a new GZipStream object. The GZipStream class is used to compress and decompress data in the GZip data format. In this case, it's constructed with the previously created MemoryStream and the CompressionMode.Decompress. This indicates that the GZipStream should be used for decompression, i.e., to decompress the data contained in array2.It's part of a process involving dynamic loading and reflection. It reads and possibly processes data from a MemoryStream, uses that data to load an assembly or access its contents, and then retrieves a specific type from that assembly.Rd is designed to dynamically load a .NET assembly from a byte array, denoted as u0020. It employs a nested, infinite loop structure with a switch statement for control flow. Initially, it attempts to load the assembly using Assembly.Load(u0020). The code's flow is influenced by the result of global::dr.hA.EV(), a method call whose purpose is unclear. If EV() returns a non-null value, the method exits the loop prematurely via a go to statement. The method's coding style, characterized by unconventional variable naming and complex looping, suggests a potential for obfuscation, possibly to conceal the actual functionality or make reverse-engineering more challenging.ReactionDiffusionAfter loading assembly we get a new binary in modules with the name of ReactionDiffusion.Then it disposes the “memorystream” which means the work of the memory stream is done here. Probably it will now move on to the next binary.After that it also dispose the gzip stream which was used to get the binary.Now let's track where it would go next in ReactionDiffusion. If we investigate the object where it is pointing its type show us the destination namespace and class.Since there were no method calls from previous binary. So, we created break point at constructor at it hit exact on it.There was nothing useful in ReactionDiffusion there, maybe it was all decoy code. Let's see what next the Ben binary does, in case 8 it gets bitmap from resources.RS MethodThe RS method in C# is designed to retrieve a Bitmap image from resources using reflection and obfuscated code patterns. It starts by declaring a ResourceManager to access embedded resources, using a dynamically constructed resource name from the first-string parameter, u0020. This parameter, along with a similarly named second parameter, is used in a nested, infinite loop structure with a switch statement. Bitmap is obtained by the method global::dr.hA.rY, which likely extracts the image from the resources. The control flow includes checks with global::dr.hA.EV() and global::dr.hA.m3(), whose purposes are unclear, but they seem to influence the flow and decision-making within the method. The use of obfuscated names (like u0020) and complex control flow suggests an intent to mask the code's functionality or purpose.Loading the assembly from byte arrayIt defines a private static method named Rd that takes a byte array u0020 as its parameter.It initializes an integer variable num with the value 1.Inside an infinite loop (for (;;)), the code performs the following actions: a. It declares a variable num2 and assigns it the value of num. b. It enters another loop (for (;;)). c. Within the inner loop, there is a switch statement with two cases:Case 1:It attempts to load an assembly using Assembly.Load(u0020), where u0020 represents the byte array passed as a parameter to the method.If the assembly is successfully loaded, it sets num2 to 0.It then checks whether global::dr.hA.EV() is not null. If it's not null, the code proceeds to the Block_1 label.If global::dr.hA.EV() is null, it effectively exits the loop and returns the loaded assembly.Default case:If none of the cases match, it returns the assembly variable, which would have been assigned earlier in the code. d. The Block_1 label is used to indicate the point where the code should continue if global::dr.hA.EV() is not null. It doesn't contain any specific code logic in the provided snippet.TyroneIt looks like another binary is coming. Another DLL loaded in modules with the name Tyrone.Invoking AJBqklj3Jn from tyorne { YcMqTyPiynJnoycycL.MhMHeAYqAZ6AJWSu3o}This is more obfuscated than previous binaries.Checking for the presence of a named mutex, which may be used by malware for synchronization or coordination purposes. “wnmJOXavioKPdkNYG”It tried to open but since if there is no mutex it goes to exception. If it exists it will end itself in second line.Creating MutexIt creates a new Mutex object with the name “wnmJOXavioKPdkNYG”. Mutexes are synchronization primitives used to control access to shared resources among multiple threads or processes.This was all to get path of appdata and then append it with “EiHjExP.exe”.“C:UsersusernameAppDataRoamingEiHjExP.exe”Check if not there Copy it.Change Directory PermissionIt adds access control entries to the directorySecurity object using the MhMHeAYqAZ6AJWSu3o.PR6qMi9p2U method. These entries seem to define permissions for specific file system rights (e.g., Read, ReadAndExecute, Delete, Write, etc.) with different access control types (e.g., Allow, Deny). The permissions are set for various inheritance flags and propagation flags, which determine how permissions are inherited by child objects.It removes “currentuser” security to change file and write permission.As you can see the permission are denied nowRemcos is doing this because it makes it safe from being changed or deleted from disc.Then it gets a base64 encoded text fetched from modules of this tyrone binary with this code.I decode this string from https://www.base64decode.org/ and it turns out that it is xml.There is code for decoding also in the remcos.Then this function is called to play with Microsoft Security. This function decodes the text which was fetched from module.It then creates a new process, assign a new stratinfo with it and give file name “powershell” which it gets from the module. In arguments of process, it gives @”Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath “”C:UsersshaddyAppDataRoamingEiHjExP.exe”””Set process's window hidden.Windows ExclusionIt will be added to the exclusion but keep in mind that I was running it from admin, if not performing analysis from admin it will be able to add since so far there was not privilege escalation performed.Path.GetTempFileName(); it will return a string that represents a unique temporary file name. This file name is generated using a combination of a temporary directory path and a unique identifier, making it highly unlikely to clash with other temporary files in the system.It gets the identity of current user, exe path to update the xml. In the breakpoint it is updating the xml and saving it in text variable.The clean xml code.PersistenceAfter that it is writing all xml in tmp file.It then loads the command of scheduling task from modules and sets startupinfo of process. Process is executed with window style hidden, Filename “schtask.exe” and with following arguments.@”/Create /TN “”UpdatesEiHjExP”” /XML “”C:UsersshaddyAppDataLocalTemptmp66E3.tmp”””This command appears to be creating a new scheduled task with the name “UpdatesEiHjExP” and configuring it using an XML file located at “C:UsersshaddyAppDataLocalTemptmp66E3.tmp.”It is triggering the exe after every system restarts.Then it deletes the tmp file.After that it loads new assembly “xF7siMsac” from its resource manager.It is injecting this final binary and executing it. Let's see its injection inside process hacker.Another binary which is extracted and DE obfuscated from resources.Remcos / 5thstageAfter saving the binary from u0020 it looks exactly like client agent built from the original remcos agent from hxxps://breakingsecurity.net/remcos/. The logo is also the same, but its signature was not present in any online threat intelligence.https://www.virustotal.com/gui/search/f55fc4f4e1bcbe957d20750f56cd98869c717c18c14c8b6d42698557b254ad51This final stage was developed in c++ language. And before analysis when we perform strings filter there was something linking to remcos, this pattern comes almost in every remcos rat.Now let's start the debugger to look more into it. We can see some more identifications.It starts with calling GetAddrInfoW API which is pointing to rungmotors20.ddns.net:60247.GetAddrInfoW is a Windows API function that is used for network operations. It's part of the Windows Sockets (Winsock) API and is typically called to resolve network addresses or to perform name resolution, converting a hostname like a domain or a URL into an IP address that can be used to establish network connections.If running from admin privileges, it creates a directory [C:\ProgramData\remcos] using CreateDirectoryW API.CreateDirectoryW is a function in the Windows API that is used to create a new directory. The W at the end of CreateDirectoryW indicates that this function uses wide characters (Unicode), as opposed to CreateDirectoryA, which uses ANSI characters.After creating Directory, it creates file with name logs.dat using CretaeFileW api.There are privileges check also it is handling both cases smoothly. It is just paths which it used separately.While executed from admin it uses [ C:\ProgramData\remcos folder]. It creates thread and that thread in loop performs these steps.If executed from normal permission, it uses [C:\Users\username\Local\VirtualStore\ProgramData\remcos\logs.dat]It sets its mark on the system in registry. It sets exepath, licence and time for thread.Patching TLSAll traffic was encrypted so we must check what is being sent. There was TLS check which was on in our client rate.Since we cannot see what it is sending to server, because of TLS flag is on. It will send all the traffic encrypted. After patching this, we can analyze the traffic.After finding the check I was able to turn off the TLS and see all the traffic clearly. It was sending the device identification after every few seconds to server.This was sample data that rat was sending.$ KRemoteHost||DESKTOP-002IHON/shaddy||US||Windows 10 Enterprise (64 bit)||||8588939264||4.9.2 Pro||C:ProgramDataremcoslogs.dat||C:UsersshaddyDesktop5thstage.exe||||5thstage.exe — PID: 3308 — Module: 5thstage.exe — Thread: Main Thread 6232 — x32dbg [Elevated]||1||47||48556593||1||rungmotors20.ddns.net||Rmc-ZT6SIL||0||C:UsersshaddyDesktop5thstage.exe||12th Gen Intel(R) Core(TM) i7–12700KF||Exe||||Clipboard and Process recordingInside the thread it was performing three major activities because the one who built it, he/she only want to record clipboards, records keylogging and setting some registries. It records all the clipboards data inside the same logs.dat file. Only it appends [Text copied to clipboard] at initial and [End of clipboard] at end.It also keeps recording the process which spawns, its architecture, its user access and all the keystrokes also.Rules & IOCsYara Rulesrule remcos_pro_4_9_2{meta:author = “Osama Ellahi”description = “Remcos RAT 4.9.2 pro version from breakpoint”strings:$string_match1 = “© by P.J. Plauger, licensed by Dinkumware, Ltd. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED” ascii fullword$string_match2 = “tRemcos v” ascii fullword$string_match3 = “BreakingSecurity.net” ascii fullword$string_match4 = “4.9.2 Pro” ascii fullword$string_match6 = “[Text pasted from clipboard]” ascii fullword$string_match7 = “[End of clipboard]” ascii fullword$string_match8 = “[End of clipboard]” ascii fullword$string_match9 = “[Text copied to clipboard]” ascii fullword$string_match11 = “Offline Keylogger Started” ascii fullword$string_match12 = “Offline Keylogger Stopped” ascii fullword$string_match13 = “Online Keylogger Started” ascii fullword$string_match14 = “Online Keylogger Stopped” ascii fullword$string_match15 = “Remcos restarted by watchdog!” ascii fullword$string_match16 = “Watchdog module activated” ascii fullword$string_match17 = “Watchdog launch failed!” ascii fullword$string_match18 = “[Chrome StoredLogins not found]” ascii fullword$string_match19 = “[Chrome StoredLogins found, cleared!]” ascii fullword$string_match20 = “[Chrome Cookies not found]” ascii fullword$string_match21 = “[Chrome Cookies found, cleared!]” ascii fullword$string_match22 = “[Firefox StoredLogins not found]” ascii fullword$string_match23 = “[Firefox Cookies not found]” ascii fullword$string_match24 = “[Firefox cookies found, cleared!]” ascii fullword$string_match25 = “[Firefox StoredLogins Cleared!]” ascii fullword$string_match26 = [IE cookies not found] ascii fullword$string_match27 = [IE cookies cleared!] ascii fullword$string_match28 = [Cleared browsers logins and cookies.] ascii fullword$string_paths1 = “\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cookies” ascii fullword$string_paths2 = “\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\” ascii fullword$string_paths3 = “Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders” ascii fullword$string_paths4 = “Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\” ascii fullword$string_paths5 = = “\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data” ascii fullword$string_paths6 = “Software\Microsoft\EventSounds\Sounds” ascii fullword$string_paths7 = “System\CurrentControlSet\Control\MediaProperties\PrivateProperties\Joystick\Winmm” ascii fullword$string_commands1 = “CreateObject(”WScript.Shell”).Run ”cmd /c ””” ascii fullword$string_commands2 = “CreateObject(”Scripting.FileSystemObject”).DeleteFile(Wscript.ScriptFullName)” ascii fullword$string_commands3 = “\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data” ascii fullword$string_commands4 = “/k %windir%\System32\reg.exe ADD HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v EnableLUA /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f” ascii$string_url1 = “http://geoplugin.net/json.gp" ascii fullword$string_url2 = “rungmotors20.ddns.net” ascii fullwordcondition:uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 600KB and filesize >200KBand(any of ($string_url*)or3 of ($string_paths*)or5 of ($string_match*))}Callback URLsURL: rungmotors20.ddns.net Port: 60247URL: hxxp://geoplugin.net/json.gp Port: 443IOC1stSHA256 —2e5c4d023167875977767da513d8889f1fc09fb18fdadfd95c66a6a890b5ca3f2ndMD5 —3125f77575829f3b710f5a15912dec20 *stage2.dllSHA256 —1cc58fba1d1b4c7e0b9d752ea7f03fa3c312ae2fc53796d5b3acea98e6ea3c0e *stage2.dll3rdSHA256 —d01f3dea3851602ba5a0586c60430d286adf6fcc7e17aab080601a66630606e5 *stage3.dllMD5 —579197d4f760148a9482d1ebde113259 *stage3.dll4thSHA256 —c5928572e371b0a5d3109d0a7431ca9e064216beb858f04dc8d0140ccaf44b84 *Tyrone.dllMD5 —dd76e11ff9b96efdcf3cd377126c8d96 *Tyrone.dll5thSHA256 —f55fc4f4e1bcbe957d20750f56cd98869c717c18c14c8b6d42698557b254ad51 *5thstage.malMD5 —dc05d4f2864dfafa9b91e8e0d79840e3 *5thstage.malReferenceshttps://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/1339230/0/htmlhttps://www.jaiminton.com/reverse-engineering/remcos#part-2-decompiling-binaryUnfolding Remcos RAT- 4.9.2 Pro was originally published in InfoSec Write-ups on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

ascii fullword Detection Explained Explained Executive

In an era where cybersecurity threats are rampant, securing your web server is of utmost importance. Apache, one of the most widely used web servers, provides a robust platform for hosting websites and applications. In this article, we will delve into the implementation of security headers in Apache to enhance the security posture of your server and protect against various web-based attacks.Why Security Headers?Security headers are HTTP response headers that provide an additional layer of security by instructing the browser on how to behave when interacting with your website. They help mitigate common security vulnerabilities and protect against attacks such as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), and Clickjacking.PrerequisitesBefore we proceed, make sure you have:1. A working Apache server.2. Administrative access to your server.Enabling Mod HeadersApache's `mod_headers` module is essential for manipulating HTTP headers. Ensure that the module is enabled by running the following commands:sudo a2enmod headerssudo systemctl restart apache2Configuring Security Headers1. X-Content-Type-OptionsThe `X-Content-Type-Options` header prevents browsers from interpreting files as a MIME type other than what is declared by the server. Insert the subsequent line into your Apache configuration file:Header always set X-Content-Type-Options “nosniff”2. X-Frame-OptionsProtect your site against clickjacking attacks by setting the `X-Frame-Options` header. This header restricts the loading of a webpage in an iframe. Include the subsequent line in your configuration:Header always set X-Frame-Options “SAMEORIGIN”3. Content Security Policy (CSP)CSP is a powerful header that helps prevent XSS attacks by defining a set of rules for content sources. Create a robust CSP policy according to your website's needs. For example:Set the Content-Security-Policy header to “default-src ‘self'; script-src ‘self' https://trusted-scripts.com; style-src ‘self' https://trusted-styles.com" for all requests.4. X-XSS-ProtectionEnable the browser's built-in XSS protection by adding the following line:Header always set X-XSS-Protection “1; mode=block”5. Strict Transport Security (HSTS)HSTS ensures that your website is only accessible over HTTPS, reducing the risk of man-in-the-middle attacks. Include the following in your configuration:Header always set Strict-Transport-Security “max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload”Testing Your ConfigurationAfter implementing these security headers, it's crucial to validate your configuration. Online tools like [SecurityHeaders.com](https://securityheaders.com) can analyze your website's headers and provide recommendations for improvement.ConclusionBy implementing security headers in your Apache server, you significantly enhance your website's resilience against a variety of web-based attacks. Regularly audit and update your security headers to adapt to evolving security threats. Remember that security is an ongoing process, and staying proactive is key to maintaining a secure web presence.Linkedin:- sandeepvishwakarma1For personalize training Contact : sv110040@gmail.comImplementation of Security headers in Apache Server was originally published in InfoSec Write-ups on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Apache Server

CompTIA Pentest exam objectives official exam

ESET's research team reveals details about the onboarding process of the Telekopye scam operation and the various methods that the fraudsters use to defraud people online

online Telekopye team reveals Telekopye scam

Insight into groups operating Telekopye bots that scam people in online marketplaces

Neanderthals secrets operating Telekopye secrets Insight Telekopye bots

Phoneinfoga: A phone number OSINT frameworkThe main aim of writing this blog is to get you all familiar with Phoneinfoga, its features, its use cases, and its working.What is Phoneinfoga?Phoneinfoga is one of the most widely used osint tool for investigating phone numbers. It is the tool that comes first in mind when gathering information about any phone number. It helps you gather the following information about a phone number -Basic information like country, area, carrier, line typeFinding if it's a VOIP number or notChecking for its online reputationInstallation -The process of its installation is as follows -For Unix systems like Kali Linux -Download the latest release in the current directory using the below commandbash <( curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sundowndev/phoneinfoga/master/support/scripts/install )For installing it globallysudo install ./phoneinfoga /usr/local/bin/phoneinfogaNow just check if it's installed correctly, by typing phoneinfoga, and the installation is done.Phoneinfoga screenshotFor Mac OS users -If you have Homebrew installed on your Mac, just type the below command and it will get installed, otherwise, install Homebrew first and then type the below command.brew install phoneinfogaFor installation in docker, read the official documentation.Environment Setup -As we have now installed the tool, it's time to set up its environment by configuring the scanners and required API keys for using all its features.Step 1- Go to https://numverify.com/ and create a free account for getting your free API which is enough for normal users. Once you sign up, go to the dashboard, and copy the API access key from the dashboard.Step 2 — Using Google Search Engine and Google dorking, it give you two options, firstly it will generate links for you to check the phone number on Google Search where you need to open all links manually in your browser.The second option is using Google Scraping to automate the above tasks. But it requires Google Search JSON API which only allows 100 free search queries/day for free. To use it further, you need to purchase queries.We will show the demonstration of it in our upcoming Youtube video which will be the complete guide to phoneinfoga. Subscribe to our Youtube Channel using the below link.https://www.youtube.com/@OSINTAMBITIONStep 3 — Configuring the values in the tool. Replace all the values in the below command and parse it in your terminal..env.localNUMVERIFY_API_KEY=”value”GOOGLECSE_CX=”value”GOOGLE_API_KEY=”value”That's it, we are done with the setup, let's understand its usage.Usage -For running a scan, you can use any of the following formats for entering the phone number and parse it in your terminal.phoneinfoga scan -n “+1 (555) 444–1212”phoneinfoga scan -n “+33 06 79368229”phoneinfoga scan -n “33679368229”Note — Parse any one command from the above three ones as per your convenience.That's it, it will display all the information as per your environment in the terminal.That's it for this blog. Thanks for reading this, subscribe to stay tuned about our upcoming blogs.Follow our amazing writer Dheeraj Yadav on Twitter.Don't forget to follow OSINT Ambition on Twitter to stay ahead and updated in the OSINT community.Phoneinfoga: A phone number OSINT framework | Day1 of 30DaysOfOSINT was originally published in InfoSec Write-ups on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Phoneinfoga

Black Friday 2023 is here, and great deals are live in computer security, software, online courses, system admin services, antivirus, and VPN software. [...]

admin services Antivirus Deals